Topic Tags: International Economy

Will China’s Changing Workforce Slow its Growth?

Lost among all the chatter about China and its effects on oil prices, global economies, and capital markets is the evolution of its workforce, which can at least partially explain some of the “hard landing” scenarios discussed for the country. More specifically, the slowing growth in China’s working age population is not expected to reverse, and this trend could have a meaningful impact on future growth prospects, both domestically and abroad.

Lost among all the chatter about China and its effects on oil prices, global economies, and capital markets is the evolution of its workforce, which can at least partially explain some of the “hard landing” scenarios discussed for the country. More specifically, the slowing growth in China’s working age population is not expected to reverse, and this trend could have a meaningful impact on future growth prospects, both domestically and abroad. If its workforce is aging and growing at a rate slower than past generations, future economic growth may be muted.

Shown here in the red line is China’s working age population, using the left-hand axis, as it grew from about 800 million in 1990 to about 1 billion today, and its projected decline projected to about 750 million in 2050. We similarly plotted Japan’s working age population, using the right-hand axis, but 20 years earlier, in the blue line. Japan showed a similar trajectory of working age population growth, from about 70 million in 1970 to a peak of about 85 million in 1995, and is projected to drop to 70 million in 2030. In other words, China’s working age population growth and decline pattern are almost identical to that of Japan’s, but only one generation behind.

With Japan’s working age population currently less than its peak in 1995, economic growth has slowed as the non-working age population increasingly lives off of the economic growth generated by the working age population. Japan has had to resort to fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and structural reforms (Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “Three Arrows” Abenomics policies) to battle this slowdown. If the current trajectory of its workforce continues, China may also have to implement similar measures in the decades to come. While continued technological and production efficiencies as well as a delay in the retirement age may help mitigate this slowdown, it is a dynamic that bears watching in the coming years.

2016 Market Preview

January 2016

Similar to previous years, we offer our annual market preview newsletter. Each year presents new challenges to our clients, and 2016 is off to a volatile start with equity markets down significantly, oil dropping below $30, the Fed poised to further increase interest rates, and fears of a China slowdown rippling through the markets. However, other headlines will emerge as the year goes on, and it is critical to understand how asset classes will react to each new development and what such reactions will mean to investors. The following articles contain insightful analysis and key themes to monitor over the coming year, themes which will underlie the actual performance of the asset classes covered.

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The Implications of a Stronger Dollar on Emerging Market Investments

In 2015, the emerging market equity index declined 14.9%. While there are a variety of explanations for this, one can not underestimate the impact of a stronger dollar. In fact, currency losses were responsible for more than 60% of the decline for U.S.-based investors.

In 2015, the emerging market equity index declined 14.9%. While there are a variety of explanations for this, one can not underestimate the impact of a stronger dollar. In fact, currency losses were responsible for more than 60% of the decline for U.S.-based investors. This week’s chart of the week examines the mechanics of how a stronger dollar can drive losses for emerging market investments.

Typically when U.S. interest rates rise, the dollar strengthens relative to foreign currencies. Investors oftentimes onshore investments during rising rate periods, and as a result, the country as a whole “exports” less dollars. The commodity price declines — especially oil — have been a major contributor to the rise in the U.S. dollar as the U.S. exports fewer dollars per unit. In our chart, we use the quantity of oil imported multiplied by its price as a proxy for the amount of dollars exported each month. During 2014, the United States imported an average of $26 billion a month in oil. During the first ten months of 2015, the U.S. imported an average of $14 billion a month, clearly a large drop and in conjunction with dollar strengthening and emerging market equity declines.

So why do emerging market investments fall? Emerging market economies often depend on dollar-denominated revenues to service debts as well as manage interest rates and exchange rates. If emerging market countries are receiving less dollars from the U.S., they face increased pressures from higher borrowing costs and lower dollar-denominated revenues. In addition, with less revenue, it is more difficult to promote internal growth via exchange rates or interest rate policies. Unfortunately, as U.S. interest rates are poised to rise further in 2016, emerging markets are likely to experience heightened volatility as a result.

How Soon Should We Expect the Next Recession?

What has become known as the Great Recession officially came to an end in June 2009. Since then, GDP has expanded to new real highs, we are approaching full employment, and the U.S. dollar is the strongest it has been in the past decade. Though various issues remain within the economy, overall things seem to be going well.

What has become known as the Great Recession officially came to an end in June 2009. Since then, GDP has expanded to new real highs, we are approaching full employment, and the U.S. dollar is the strongest it has been in the past decade. Though various issues remain within the economy, overall things seem to be going well.

The question on many people’s minds is how long can this last? Currently, we are 78 months out from the trough of the recession. Of the recessions since WWII, on average the period from the end of one recession to the start of the next lasts 58 months, suggesting we may be due. However, the last three recovery/expansion phases lasted longer than this and during the 1990s this period lasted 120 months leading up to the Tech Bubble.

Additionally, recessions do not occur simply with the passage of time; generally, there has to be a catalyst for the drop. Potential current areas of concern include slower wage growth, lower productivity, and the Fed tightening monetary policy.  However, the worst shocks to the economy are often unexpected; very few people predicted the housing crash. At this point though, there don’t seem to be any major red flags. The IMF’s most recent World Economic Outlook predicted only a 16% chance of the U.S. entering a recession through the first half of 2016. Also, with the last recession the worst since the Great Depression, it is plausible that the next crisis could be delayed as a result of people exhibiting more caution as it relates to spending and speculation. Ultimately, it is impossible to accurately predict when a recession will occur, so while the U.S. could enter a recession at anytime, we may still have several more years of expansion ahead of us.

Divergent Central Bank Policy

This week’s Chart of the Week shows the divergence in Monetary Policy from the ECB, Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve discontinued its quantitative easing (“QE”) strategy October 29th 2014; in contrast, after the end of 3Q14, the Bank of Japan and European Central Bank have increased asset holdings 30% and 26%, respectively.

This week’s Chart of the Week shows the divergence in Monetary Policy from the ECB, Bank of Japan, and Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve discontinued its quantitative easing (“QE”) strategy on October 29th, 2014; in contrast, after the end of 3Q14, the Bank of Japan and European Central Bank have increased asset holdings by 30% and 26%, respectively.

During the same time period, the Euro and Yen have depreciated by over 10%, now trading at approximately 85% of their 10-year averages. The Bank of Japan and European Central Bank will continue large asset purchases for the foreseeable future in an effort to reduce borrowing costs and stimulate growth.

In the short term, foreign multinational corporations should utilize suppressed borrowing costs and weaker currencies as tailwinds for exports. This is best explained by third-party consumers’ attraction to the Eurozone and Japan’s relative prices of goods. QE’s goal to stimulate economic growth has had positive externalities on each bank’s respective currency; over the long run, the currency effect should be normalized as foreign direct investment is attracted to higher revenues and profits, yielding currency demand.

The Eurozone growth estimate of 0.3% advocates further action will be taken by the ECB through QE. Increased stimulus levels will force the Euro towards parity with the dollar for the first time in over a decade. Until there are better signs of growth from Eurozone nations, the ECB will be forced to use monetary stimulus and currency demand will continue to decline.

China: Manufacturing vs. Services

This week’s chart examines Markit’s Purchase Manager Index (PMI) for the manufacturing and services sectors in China.  PMI serves as an indicator of economic health.  A reading above 50 represents expansion while a reading below 50 indicates contraction.

This week’s chart examines Markit’s Purchase Manager Index (PMI) for the manufacturing and services sectors in China. PMI serves as an indicator of economic health. A reading above 50 represents expansion while a reading below 50 indicates contraction. The manufacturing sector (blue line) continues to weaken with the September flash coming in at 47. Meanwhile, the services sector (red line), an increasingly important part of the economy, remains in expansion territory.

Given the economy’s current size and transition from export-driven to domestic consumption-focused, a slowdown in overall growth should be expected, with more growth ultimately coming from consumption (represented by the service sector) than export-related activity (measured by manufacturing). Analysts have often cited 5–6% as a reasonable range for medium-term growth, a far cry from a crash landing. The IMF recently cited China’s progress in domestic rebalancing, with consumption contributing slightly more growth than gross fixed capital.1 Therefore, the traditional data points focused on manufacturing and infrastructure do not provide a complete picture of the current Chinese economy. Instead, the growth in services PMI reflects how the Chinese economy is becoming more dependent on domestic consumption than exports to other countries.

 

1 IMF Country Report No. 15/234, August 2015

Is the Canary in the Coal Mine of the Global Economy Sounding an Alarm?

This week’s chart of the week looks at the recent drop in South Korean exports, which fell by 14.7% in the 12 months ending August 31. South Korean exports have historically been a reliable and early indicator of the state of global trade, so much so that they have earned the nickname, the “canary in the coal mine” of the global economy.

This week’s chart of the week looks at the recent drop in South Korean exports, which fell by 14.7% in the 12 months ending August 31. South Korean exports have historically been a reliable and early indicator of the state of global trade, so much so that they have earned the nickname, the “canary in the coal mine” of the global economy. This is largely due to the fact that South Korean exports are a diversified mix of raw materials (such as oil, iron, and steel), intermediate goods (such as semiconductors and machine parts), and finished goods (such as cars, ships, and consumer electronics), as well as the fact that South Korea exports goods to both developed and emerging markets.

The fact that exports dropped by 14.7% in August (the largest drop since August 2009) is notable, especially considering that the consensus forecast was for a decrease of 5.9%. Even more concerning, this was the eighth consecutive month in which exports contracted. Since 1970, every prolonged drop in South Korean exports (defined as at least six consecutive monthly declines) has coincided with a material slowdown in the global economy. This was witnessed during the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, the Asian financial crisis of the late-1990s, the bursting of the tech bubble in the early-2000s, as well as the financial crisis of 2008.

While it is too soon to tell if the canary in the coal mine is accurately predicting trouble on the horizon, this prolonged drop in exports is clearly concerning.  However, there are a few factors that could be causing this signal to be a false alarm this time around. For one, exports to China (currently representing about 25% of all South Korean exports) are a greater share of exports than they have been historically, so the slowdown in China is having a larger impact on exports than in the past. In addition, the steep plunge in commodity prices over the past year has had a major impact on South Korea’s exports of oil products, petrochemicals, as well as iron and steel. These three export sectors, which represent 6.4%, 7.3%, and 6.1% of all South Korean exports respectively, have seen the largest declines of any major sector, declining 40.3%, 25.7%, and 17.4% respectively.

Asset Class Review: What Has Worked So Far in 2015?

This week’s chart shows broad asset class returns through July 31st of this year. Perhaps the most surprising performer has been international equity, which has outperformed even U.S. equities. Much of the outperformance is due to the strong U.S. dollar, which has increased international developed countries’ exports and the number of tourists.

This week’s chart shows broad asset class returns through July 31st of this year. Perhaps the most surprising performer has been international equity, which has outperformed even U.S. equities. Much of the outperformance is due to the strong U.S. dollar, which has increased international developed countries’ exports. The same factor has in turn contributed to the lower performance of U.S. equities. With so many of the S&P 500 companies’ revenues dependent on international growth (about 46%), the strong dollar has weighed heavily on EPS growth. In addition, the same factors many of our readers have heard before — the slowdown in the energy sector and the cold winter — have also played major roles.

The other darling this year, as widely predicted, has been Real Estate. Throughout the first half of the year, growth has in large part been due to income, lease turnover, and appreciation (most notably in the Southwest U.S.). The remainder of the year is likely to see less contribution from income and more contribution from appreciation.

Now let us turn to the poor performers. Bonds, both Global and U.S., continue their same old story: the specter of the Fed rate hike continues to loom, in addition to the Greek debt crisis and China’s now not-so-secret efforts to prop up growth. Emerging Markets have been the worst performers this year, thanks in large part to their dependence on commodities and the domino effect of China’s slowing growth which has translated into weakening currencies.

Where will the rest of the year take us? As the issues we have discussed will continue to weigh on asset classes, it will not be surprising if meandering to disappointing returns across asset classes continue for the rest of 2015.

1 Real Estate Returns through 6/30/15; Private Equity Returns through 3/31/15

Some Perspective on the Size of Chinese Equity Market Losses

Over the last month, the Chinese equity market has been a cause of concern for investors and it is impossible to ignore its impact on recent market volatility.

Over the last month, the Chinese equity market has been a cause of concern for investors and it is impossible to ignore its impact on recent market volatility. In an effort to provide some perspective on the size of recent market losses in relation to Chinese consumers, this week’s chart of the week compares the size of the market cap loss to household assets represented by household deposits, 2014 GDP, household financial balance sheets, and household total balance sheets. As shown above, the Chinese equity market cap loss only represented 12% of household financial balance sheet assets which include stocks, bonds, and cash. Additionally, the market cap loss only represented 5% of total household assets which notably include personal real estate. Although the recent loss in the Chinese equity market was not insignificant, at this point in time the overall effect on the Chinese economy is bearable and should not be considered catastrophic.