Growing Bond Market in China

Our chart this week shows the five largest bond markets in the world. We will focus on China and highlight a few reasons why the Chinese bond market is projected to overtake Japan in the next few years.

For starters, up until last year capital controls put in place by the Chinese government were designed to limit foreign investment. As a result of some newly implemented reforms since then, international investors have slowly been allowed direct access to the Chinese domestic bond market. For example, on July 3, 2017 Beijing and Hong Kong opened a trading link which will allow investors based in Hong Kong to trade directly in the Chinese bond market.

Additionally, in March Citigroup announced the inclusion of Chinese onshore bonds in several of its market indices and more recently Bloomberg announced similar plans. Inclusion in multiple market indices will aid in growth while increasing foreign investment.

Finally, new rules recently implemented in China require the country’s 22 provinces to borrow in the local government bond market instead of seeking out bank financing which had previously been the preferred route. This change should also contribute positively to the continued expansion of China’s bond market and will offer greater access to more investors.

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High Yield Position Paper

Originally released in June 2011, this update to our position paper clarifies the myths about the asset class, and sheds light on the benefits and risks of high yield bonds.

The paper examines the history of high yield bond issuance, features of high yield bonds and their indices, their risks and characteristics, high yield historical returns and correlations, and how to invest in high yield bonds including relative valuation and manager selection.

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Are High Yield Bonds Overvalued Right Now?

High yield bonds enjoyed significant tailwinds in 2016:
During the year, the price of oil stabilized.
U.S. shale oil exploration and production defaults and bankruptcies worked their way through the pipeline and most are now behind us.
Trump’s win, with his promises of tax cuts and infrastructure spending, boosted investor confidence.
OPEC’s production cut agreement further added to the risk-on sentiment.

High yield bonds enjoyed significant tailwinds in 2016:

  • During the year, the price of oil stabilized.
  • U.S. shale oil exploration and production defaults and bankruptcies worked their way through the pipeline and most are now behind us.
  • Trump’s win, with his promises of tax cuts and infrastructure spending, boosted investor confidence.
  • OPEC’s production cut agreement further added to the risk-on sentiment.

All of this fueled a 17.1% return for high yield bonds during 2016, as measured by the Barclays U.S. Corporate High Yield Bond Index. Of course, “bond math” dictates that returns for any sector of the asset class have a ceiling on price escalation, and high yield bonds may be in overvalued territory right now. As we can see in this week’s chart, spreads1  — which are a primary valuation metric for bonds — are tight at the moment, at 388 basis points on January 31 for the Barclays U.S. Corporate High Yield Bond Index compared with its ten-year average of 606 basis points. In other words, current high yield bond spreads are more than 200 basis points tighter than long-term average spreads. If we exclude the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009, the long-term average spread is 508 basis points and current spreads are still considered tight. Current spreads are about as tight as they were prior to the shale oil crisis of 2014-2015.

High yield spreads typically compress to the point when a market correction occurs. This market correction typically features spread widening. Because of such tight spreads at the moment, as well as other fundamentals that we track such as aggressive use of proceeds and aggressive lower-quality issuance, spreads are more likely to widen than further tighten. As such, we recommend that clients reallocate to policy weights and maintain a cautious and conservative outlook for high yield bond allocations.

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1 Defined as the excess yield above U.S. Treasury bond yields

2017 Market Preview

January 2017

Similar to past market preview newsletters, we enter the year with a new set of questions. What shape will Trump’s policies take and how will they impact the market? Will the formal start of the Brexit have an impact on portfolios? To what degree and pace will the Fed increase interest rates? These topics among many others are covered in the following articles as we offer our annual market preview newsletter. Each year presents new challenges to our clients, and other headlines will emerge as the year goes on; it is critical to understand how asset classes will react to each new development and what such reactions will mean to investors. The following articles contain insightful analysis and key themes to monitor over the coming year, themes which will underlie the actual performance of the asset classes covered. Recognizing that many of our clients may not have time to cover the following 30 pages of material, we offer the primary conclusions for each asset class heading into 2017.

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What Does the Fed’s Rate Hike Mean for 2017?

December 2016

On December 14, 2016, the FOMC announced its unanimous decision to raise interest rates by 25 basis points, bringing the target fed funds rate to between 0.50% and 0.75%. This was the first increase since last December’s, with the hike prior to that occurring in 2006 before the Great Recession.

This move was widely anticipated and well-communicated to the markets. As such, fed funds futures carried a 100% implied probability of a hike going into it, and most – if not all – of the hike was already priced into global markets. Markets over the past one and a half days since the hike have remained relatively calm. The 10-year Treasury yield rose by only 12bp to end at 2.6%, while the one-year Treasury yield rose by just 3bp to end at 0.9% and the 30-year Treasury yield rose by 2bp to end at 3.1%. The Core Aggregate bond index and the Intermediate Government/Credit index were down only 0.5%, while the 1-3 Yr Government/Credit index fell 0.2%; the Long Government/Credit index also decreased 0.2%. The Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan index was up 0.1%, the Credit Suisse High Yield index was down 0.3%, and the JPMorgan emerging markets debt EMBI Global Diversified index decreased by less than 0.1%. The dollar rose while gold declined, as expected. The S&P 500 declined less than 0.1%.

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The Impact of Trump’s Victory on Capital Markets

November 2016

To the surprise of pollsters, analysts, and much of the American public, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump trampled predictions by winning the presidential election in stunning fashion.

The long-term impact of Trump’s presidency on financial markets is impossible to predict at this point, given the amount of uncertainty around his expected policies. However, the short-term dynamics surrounding his election win are starting to emerge, and we share with you what we are seeing and hearing in the market in this newsletter.

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Supercharged Fixed Income: Direct Lending

October 2016

Direct lending is an established asset class that provides a total return to investors typically between that of high yield bonds and mezzanine debt. It is considered private credit because the assets in a direct lending portfolio are loans originated privately between the direct lending fund manager (acting as lender) and the borrowing company. Due to the private nature of direct lending, the asset class produces attractive risk-adjusted returns supported by reduced competition, lower volatility, and favorable negotiation leverage for the direct lender. Since the financial crisis of 2008, direct lending as an asset class has featured unprecedented growth in deal volume as well as assets under management. This growth is attributed largely to post-crisis regulations that effectively forced banks, the traditional direct lenders of the past, to shed their direct lending operations. Non-bank direct lending asset managers have in turn benefitted from the significant rise in direct lending opportunities.

Read > Supercharged Fixed Income: Direct Lending

Is the Recent Spike in LIBOR a Cause for Concern?

This week’s chart of the week looks at the recent spike in the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which is the rate at which banks charge one another for short term loans. As the chart illustrates, over the past year the 3-month LIBOR rate has increased from 0.32% to 0.88% (an increase of 0.56%), which is the highest rate for 3-month LIBOR since the spring of 2009. While other measures of short term interest rates – such as the Fed Funds Rate (increasing from 0.25% to 0.50%) and 3-month T-Bills (increasing from 0.01% to 0.33%) – have also risen over the past year, the magnitude of the LIBOR increase is significantly larger and warrants further examination.

This week’s chart of the week looks at the recent spike in the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which is the rate at which banks charge one another for short-term loans. As the chart illustrates, over the past year the 3-month LIBOR rate has increased from 0.32% to 0.88% (an increase of 0.56%), which is the highest rate for 3-month LIBOR since the spring of 2009. While other measures of short term interest rates — such as the Fed Funds Rate (increasing from 0.25% to 0.50%) and 3-month T-Bills (increasing from 0.01% to 0.33%) — have also risen over the past year, the magnitude of the LIBOR increase is significantly larger and warrants further examination.

Over the past few months, both the Fed Funds Rate and T-Bills have remained flat, while LIBOR has continued to increase steadily (increasing from 0.65% on June 30th to 0.88% on September 18th). During this time period, the spread between LIBOR and T-Bills (known as the TED spread) has increased from 0.39% to 0.55%. In fact, the current spread of 0.55% is higher than the 0.42% average TED spread since the year 2000. This is concerning because historically, an increase in the TED spread has indicated stress in the financial markets. The TED spread spiked in mid-2007 when signs of the financial crisis first started to appear, and spiked again in 2008 as the crisis unfolded. Now that the TED spread is increasing again, there is some concern that this may be an early sign of another financial crisis starting to unfold.

In order to put the recent rise in LIBOR (and the corresponding rise in the TED spread) in context, it is important to look at what has driven these rates higher. Unlike the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the recent increase in LIBOR is not a result of distress in the credit markets. In fact, between June 30th and September 18th, high yield credit spreads (a reliable measure of the health of the credit markets) decreased by 1.4%. And unlike the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the recent increase in the TED spread has been relatively small. While the current 0.55% TED spread is slightly greater than the long-term average, it is well below the 4.63% peak we saw during the fourth quarter of 2008. The recent increase in LIBOR appears to be driven primarily by the money market reforms that went into effect on October 14th that require most money market funds to invest exclusively in U.S. government securities. As a result of this new regulation, more than $1 trillion has moved out of “prime” money market funds, which were allowed to invest in short-term corporate bonds and certificates of deposit tied to LIBOR rates, and into “government only” money market funds. It is unclear whether the increase in LIBOR rates and TED spreads are a temporary phenomenon driven by a supply/demand imbalance or if this is a permanent structural change. Either way, this is something that should be monitored closely in the coming months.

Growth in Direct Lending

This week’s chart shows the significant growth in direct lending over the last decade, as indicated by the number of funds and amount of capital raised.

Direct lending is defined as a loan made by a private entity to a small – medium size company which generally carries a floating interest rate. The loans have a 3 to 5 year term and are in most cases held to maturity. For some perspective, this space was largely dominated by commercial banks and proprietary trading desks at investment banks leading up to the global financial crisis of 2008 when private lenders had little market share. The landscape has changed since then as banks now face significant regulatory pressure as a result of the Basel III and Dodd-Frank bills, which call for higher risk-based capital charges for non-rated loans and an increase of 25% or more in Tier 1 capital ratios by 2018, making the practice of direct lending an increasingly inefficient use of bank balance sheet capital.

This week’s chart shows the significant growth in direct lending over the last decade, as indicated by the number of funds and amount of capital raised.

Direct lending is defined as a loan made by a private entity to a small–medium size company which generally carries a floating interest rate. The loans have a 3- to 5-year term and are in most cases held to maturity. For some perspective, this space was largely dominated by commercial banks and proprietary trading desks at investment banks leading up to the global financial crisis of 2008 when private lenders had little market share. The landscape has changed since then as banks now face significant regulatory pressure as a result of the Basel III and Dodd-Frank bills, which call for higher risk-based capital charges for non-rated loans and an increase of 25% or more in Tier 1 capital ratios by 2018, making the practice of direct lending an increasingly inefficient use of bank balance sheet capital.

As a result, banks today are virtually inactive in this area and direct lending by private investment managers has emerged as a natural structural replacement. On the demand side, the current low global interest rate environment is fueling increased appetite for this strategy as investors continue to search for yield and diversification in their portfolios.

Look Out For Falling Angels

Over the past year, many bonds from energy and metal/minerals issuers which previously held investment grade ratings were reduced to junk bond status, commonly known as fallen angels. These include Freeport-McMoRan, the largest copper producer in the world and Chesapeake Energy, the second-largest gas producer in the U.S. This week’s chart examines this unprecedented phenomenon. Fallen angels now account for a mind-boggling 42% of the energy and metal/minerals constituents in the Credit Suisse High Yield Index. With this influx of fallen angels, energy and metal/minerals now make up about 21% of the high yield index, up from 15% in February.

Over the past year, many bonds from energy and metal/minerals issuers which previously held investment grade ratings were reduced to junk bond status, commonly known as fallen angels. These include Freeport-McMoRan, the largest copper producer in the world and Chesapeake Energy, the second-largest gas producer in the U.S. This week’s chart examines this unprecedented phenomenon. Fallen angels now account for a mind-boggling 42% of the energy and metal/minerals constituents in the Credit Suisse High Yield Index. With this influx of fallen angels, energy and metal/minerals now make up about 21% of the high yield index, up from 15% in February.

Many investment grade strategies, as well as their institutional investors, have been forced to sell these fallen angels because of investment policy guidelines, temporarily depressing prices and thus presenting cheaper than normal buying opportunities. Furthermore, the shift of bonds from investment grade to high yield has created a unique challenge for the team dynamics of investment managers. Investment grade research analysts are losing issuers to cover since many of them have been downgraded while high yield research analysts are now responsible for covering more issuers. Some investment managers are even transferring investment grade analysts to high yield positions because they are already familiar with the bonds that have become fallen angels.

Marquette recommends that investors maintain their high yield bond allocations. Because of these temporarily depressed prices and the change in name coverage within investment management teams, inefficiencies and opportunities have been created in this cross-over section of the bond market. However, there are risks. We should continue to see an increase in the default rate for high yield energy and metals/minerals issuers. Given lower commodity prices across the globe, while costs have been reduced for pumping oil or mining for metals, the energy and metal/minerals industries have yet to make any significant improvements. Many companies are still filing for bankruptcy, even though oil prices are beginning to slightly rebound. Ultimately, the current opportunities should outweigh these risks, but volatility in the high yield market will likely remain elevated for the foreseeable future.