Author: cvernon

Sustainable Investing Among Equity Asset Classes

Sustainable investing continues to grow in both size and relevance among institutional investors and asset managers. As a matter of background, sustainable investing is a term that encompasses three broad approaches: ESG Integration, Socially Responsible Investing, and Impact Investing. As elaborated on in Marquette’s Sustainable Investing video series, the definitions of each of these terms are:

  • ESG Integration: Returns-focused investing that incorporates long-term sustainability factors (Environmental, Social, Governance) into the investment process.
  • Socially Responsible Investing (SRI): Investments driven first by ethical values.
  • Impact Investing: Investments with the specific intent to create and measure social and/or environmental impacts alongside financial returns.

While SRI and Impact Investing are more targeted strategies driven by underlying initiatives and/or beliefs, ESG integration has allowed portfolio management teams of more traditional approaches to consider social and environmental issues in a more tangible way than in the past. As ESG factors are more ingrained in the investment processes, there will be more investment options that contribute, directly or indirectly, to some of the ideals sought after in SRI and Impact portfolios. As shown in the above chart, investors have options across the global equity universe for both ESG integrated funds as well as dedicated SRI/Impact Investing funds. The proportions of each are likely to expand as sustainability investing trends accelerate globally.

Along with this growth comes an increased emphasis on measurable impact and standardized reporting, both of which have been a challenge in the sustainable investing space. We have started to see investment managers adopt the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) as a framework for expressing the sustainable intent or reach of their portfolio. For instance, there is a growing contingent of investment managers that have mapped their portfolio holdings to one or more SDGs based on whether the firm’s product or service aided or harmed the stated end goal. We have also seen many investment managers become signatories of the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) over the last three years. The UN PRI are comprised of six foundational principles that work to support and encourage ESG investing. Another sustainable investing reporting metric that has become more readily available is carbon intensity measures. While there have been many positive developments in recent years, investors should be cognizant of potential greenwashing — disingenuous or misleading attempts to present strategies as more ESG-focused than they actually are.

Overall, sustainable investing is moving in the right direction as more allocators and investment managers realize that returns need not be sacrificed in pursuit of positive change. In fact, a fundamental concept of sustainable investing is that firms with better ESG practices tend to fare better over the long run due to a reduced likelihood of litigation, increased diversity, and capitalization on emerging sustainable technologies, among others. Marquette continues to monitor these developments and stands ready to assist clients in pursuing their sustainable investing goals.

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eVestment Universes
U.S. Large-Cap: “US Large Cap Equity” 1,129 Products
U.S. Mid-Cap: “US Mid Cap Equity” 289 Products
U.S. Small-Cap: “US Small Cap Equity” 640 Products
International Large-Cap: “EAFE Large Cap Equity” 219 Products & “ACWI ex-US Large Cap Equity” 142 Products
International Small Cap: “EAFE Small Cap Equity” 101 Products & “ACWI ex-US Small Cap Equity” 67 Products
Emerging Markets: “All Emerging Markets Equity” 654 Products

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

Fear is the Return-Killer

Frank Herbert’s science fiction novel Dune contains a litany which states that “fear is the mind-killer.” Indeed, anxieties brought on by periods of turmoil can cause individuals to forsake rational thinking and act impulsively, usually to their own detriment. This phenomenon often manifests itself in equity markets, particularly when investors choose to curtail or altogether abandon equity allocations amid (or in expectation of) steep declines in the prices of risky assets. These impetuous actions stem from various emotional biases held by market participants including loss-aversion, which describes the asymmetrical response many individuals feel with respect to gains and losses (i.e., investors derive more pain from a loss than pleasure from a gain of equal value).

The aim of this newsletter is to demonstrate that, save for a modicum of intangible psychological comfort, sales of risky assets motivated by fear and panic provide investors no value, and can ultimately have disastrous impacts on the long-term returns of a portfolio.

Read > Fear is the Return-Killer

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

Small-Cap: Much Ado About Quality

2020 was a year in which some small-cap asset managers flourished while most struggled to adapt to the changing tides of an unprecedented global pandemic. Active managers will not soon forget the difficulty of investing in 2020, but the dynamics that predicated the market may go overlooked.

In this newsletter, we seek to address the underperformance of small-cap active managers over the last several years, focusing on factor fallout and the definition of quality. We will specifically look to address how the rise of thematic versus fundamental investing came to the forefront in 2020.

Read > Small-Cap: Much Ado About Quality

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

What Is the Most Attractive Segment of the Private Equity Market?

As private equity matures further as an asset class, median private equity returns will continue to move closer to the public markets. Nevertheless, as a result of active management and private market inefficiencies, the top quartile to median spread for private equity is still more than 2x greater than it is for public market-oriented managers. When we take a closer look at fund performance within private equity, there is significantly more upside as well as performance variability for smaller buyout funds as compared to larger buyout funds. As seen in this week’s chart, funds that are less than $1B in size had a median Net IRR of 13%, a 1st quartile range of 21–37%, and a 4th quartile range of -10–6% whereas funds greater than $6B in size had a median Net IRR of 9%, a 1st quartile range of 17–23%, and a 4th quartile range of 2–8%.

This performance dispersion is largely driven by smaller funds sourcing opportunities outside of intermediated processes, leveraging a repeatable and focused operational playbook to professionalize and grow portfolio companies quickly, and a growing list of paths to liquidity, including larger funds with an increasing amount of dry powder that are sourcing investments out of smaller managers’ funds. With that said, larger funds buy companies that are typically more mature, have built-out teams, and are capable of weathering business shocks with greater success, which accounts for the tighter band of outcomes at the larger end of the market.

Due to COVID and an inability to meet with potential investors in person, first-time funds and emerging managers which typically fall in the “small” fund size had difficulty raising capital in 2020. This dynamic is expected to have two significant effects on the 2021 private equity ecosystem: 1) first-time funds and emerging managers fundraising is likely to be more active in 2021 and 2) dry powder has been further concentrated in larger funds, which should create an increasingly attractive exit environment for smaller funds.

Given the compelling upside opportunity of investing in smaller funds and an expected increase in the number of these funds raising capital in 2021, these managers represent an attractive area of the private equity market to be allocating capital towards. Given the greater performance variability of smaller funds, allocations to funds at this size should be focused within a program that allows for a number of high-quality commitments, such as those provided by fund-of-funds.

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The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs. Opinions, estimates, projections, and comments on financial market trends constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice. Past performance does not guarantee future results. 

Into the Weeds on Cannabis Stocks

In recent years, successful marijuana legalization efforts in the United States have led to increased investor interest in the prospects of upstart cannabis-oriented businesses. Indeed, the development of a new industry often precipitates unique opportunities for market participants, as well as uncertainty of which investors should be cognizant.

The aim of this newsletter is to examine at a high level the emergence of publicly traded cannabis stocks vis-à-vis the broader equity landscape and the risks these securities may pose.

Read > Into the Weeds on Cannabis Stocks

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

Hedging Rising Inflation and Interest Rates

Rising inflation and interest rates have not been real issues for investors for several years, but both have remained popular topics of concern. While inflation does not appear to be an immediate risk given still depressed GDP and elevated unemployment, the size of the latest proposed $1.9 trillion COVID relief package has many thinking about future implications. Stimulus did not lead to inflation following the Global Financial Crisis, but there are a number of reasons, beyond the sheer size of this effort, that we could see greater inflationary pressures this time: more pent-up consumer demand, well-capitalized banks and healthy consumer balance sheets, de-globalization, and higher operational costs associated with the virus. And while the Federal Reserve has committed to maintaining its ultra-accommodative monetary policy until long-term inflation hits 2% (with shorter-term inflation allowed to rise moderately above 2% for some time), unless the Fed changes its stance on negative rates, rates can only go in one direction from here: up.

Like all things market-related, we do not recommend trying to time inflation or interest rates. In this newsletter, we analyze equity long/short hedge funds as an option for investors to potentially optimize their portfolio for this dynamic environment.

Read > Hedging Rising Inflation and Interest Rates

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

Federal Debt Rises but Federal Interest Expense Drops

Due to the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus that the federal government has provided the U.S. economy during the COVID-19 pandemic, our federal debt has been rising precipitously. As we can see from this week’s chart, the federal debt as a percentage of GDP (left chart, purple bars) skyrocketed in 2020. In the meantime, interest rates have declined, shown using the bellwether 10-year U.S. Treasury yield (left chart, orange line). Rates have declined because of haven asset-seeking from investors, driving up Treasury prices and driving down yields, as well as from developed market foreign investors seeking relatively higher yields here versus low to negative yields in their markets.

Because of the decline in rates over 2020, the federal gross interest expense on U.S. Treasury securities (right chart, purple bars) has been declining. The federal gross interest expense rate (right chart, green line), based on dividing the federal gross interest expense dollar amount by the total federal debt outstanding dollar amount, has been declining along with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield (right chart, orange line), but there has been a lag. This lag comes from newly issued, on-the-run bonds having lower yields versus existing bonds that are off-the-run, on which the Treasury is paying interest. These two charts emphasize that despite the rise in federal debt, our government is benefitting from a decline in the interest costs due to lower interest rates. This should help mitigate the total costs of supporting the U.S. economy as we recover from the COVID pandemic.

Print PDF > Federal Debt Rises Federal Interest Expense Drops

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

Prospects of Dollar Depreciation in the COVID Recovery & Impact on Asset Classes

As vaccine distribution continues in full force and the global economy’s recovery from the COVID pandemic gains momentum, investors are concerned about depreciation of the U.S. dollar and how this phenomenon might affect various asset classes within a portfolio.

In this paper, we examine the mechanics of dollar depreciation and its subsequent impact on traditional asset classes. We begin by exploring the macroeconomic factors that drive dollar strength or weakness and then examine the impact of dollar depreciation on the fixed income, U.S. equities, and non-U.S. equities asset classes both by covering the potential effects of a stronger or weaker dollar and by assessing historical performance.

Read > Prospects of Dollar Depreciation in the COVID Recovery & Impact on Asset Classes

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

 

Should Investors Be Concerned About Stagflation?

The coronavirus pandemic has disrupted everyday life and caused a devastating impact on the global economy. At the peak of the outbreak, the U.S. unemployment rate reached 11.1% and real GDP growth fell by 9.0%, which marked the second worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. On the bright side, the COVID relief programs and expansionary economic policies projected an air of optimism; as of January 2021, the unemployment rate came down to 6.3% and real GDP growth has started to recover since cratering during the first half of 2020. However, these figures are still at concerning levels, and an emerging fear is that the magnitude of economic stimulus may create a surge in inflation, in spite of middling economic growth. This week’s chart examines the nature of stagflation and how the markets perform under this condition.

The term “stagflation” comes from “stagnation” and “inflation” and can be identified as a period of slow economic growth, high unemployment, and high inflation. An example of stagflation was in the 1970s as shown in the chart. The inflation and unemployment rates (blue and orange lines) stayed in a 10–15% range when the economic growth (purple line) was slow or negative. The typical cause of stagflation is an external shock that breaks the inverse relationship between the inflation and unemployment rate; the high inflation usually indicates that the demand for goods and services is high, the economy is expanding and unemployment is low. In this case, the supply shock of oil was the main contributing factor for driving prices higher, discouraging consumption, and resulting in a recession. Stagflation is not only detrimental to the economy but also difficult to address. For example, contractionary policies such as increasing interest rates to reduce inflation may make unemployment even worse.

As shown at the bottom of the chart, the U.S. stock, international stock, bond, real estate, and commodity markets held up well during stagflation in the 1970s. The S&P GSCI commodity index returned 54.3% per year and the other markets returned 25% to 28% per year. The international stock market outperformed the U.S. stock market. The commodity market performed best but highly fluctuated with a 0.72 correlation with inflation.

The economic crisis from the pandemic coupled with the aid to boost the economy may seem like a recipe for stagflation. However, impending stagflation is unlikely. The current inflation of 1.3% is well below the central bank’s 2% target, oil prices are stable, the personal consumption expenditure is down but has recovered to 96% of its pre-pandemic level, vaccines are becoming more accessible and IMF projections are generally positive (dotted lines). As the economy further re-opens later this year, the threat of stagflation should dissipate as attention turns toward renewed economic growth.

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The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

The Big Squeeze

A group of small-cap stocks made big waves last week as retail day traders collaborated online to drive up certain stock prices in order to “squeeze” hedge funds with short positions. The influence of the retail investor has been building for over a year, facilitated by reduced trading fees, new brokerage platforms, and the time and money freed up by COVID lockdowns, but the Reddit-documented campaigns to manipulate GameStop and others brought forth entirely new dynamics.

Hedge funds take short positions when they expect stock prices to fall, generally for fundamental reasons. Short positions are inherently more risky than long positions — the downside is theoretically unlimited and short positions will increase in size as the stock moves against you, but prudent long/short managers understand these risks and typically run short portfolios that are more diversified, with smaller position sizes and tighter risk management parameters. Market sentiment and positioning is a key part of their analysis, especially on the short side. Stocks with high short interest have been red flags for many managers well before the term “Gamestonk” existed.

GameStop, AMC, Bed Bath & Beyond, and other stocks being irrationally bid up have fundamentally struggled for years. Outdated business models have led to earnings declines and multiple compression, and the impact of COVID has pulled forward bankruptcy concerns. At the same time, short interest has increased, and profitably — for the three years ending June 30th, 2020, the five stocks in the chart above lost on average 59% of their value. Over the last seven months, through the end of January, the worst performer of the group has almost tripled, and GameStop is up more than 7,000%, despite a largely unchanged fundamental outlook.

A number of hedge funds holding these higher short interest stocks were significantly impacted. At the center of the drama, Melvin Capital was reportedly down more than 50% for the month. While many hedge funds did not have direct exposure, the broader issue for the group and investors is the related de-grossing — long selling and short covering — as managers look to reduce exposure to the volatility. While de-grossing is not unusual (seen most recently in March 2020, September 2019, the fourth quarter of 2018), it has been especially rapid over the last week with hedge funds coming into the year with above average levels of gross and net leverage. While this has a created a tough backdrop for hedge fund alpha, especially coming off a record year in 2020, year to date losses have been modest. Through January, the average U.S. long/short fund was down just 2.3%,¹ relative to the S&P 500 -1.0%.

While Melvin Capital and others have publicly stated that they have fully closed out short positions on GameStop, the damage has been done, and these funds will likely face ongoing investor scrutiny over their risk management processes. But the majority of long/short funds should be able to make up any early year losses, with 2021 set up to be a good year for stock pickers. Prudent managers are re-underwriting their short positions, reducing exposure to potential targets and names with higher short interest, and many are patiently planning for the inevitable next leg. Stocks do not typically remain this severely disconnected from fundamentals for long, and at these valuations could present strong short opportunities.

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¹ Morgan Stanley Prime Brokerage

 

The opinions expressed herein are those of Marquette Associates, Inc. (“Marquette”), and are subject to change without notice. This material is not financial advice or an offer to purchase or sell any product. Marquette reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.